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JUSTICE SOUTER AND THE CIVIL RULES 
SCOTT DODSON

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 30, 2009, after almost twenty years on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Justice David Hackett Souter announced his retirement.
1
 A quiet 
personality never comfortable in the D.C. spotlight
2
 (except, perhaps, 
during his confirmation hearings
3
), Justice Souter was rarely characterized 
as a force on the Court.
4
 No doubt his legacy will be marked in large 
part—and perhaps unfairly—by his membership in the Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
5
 troika and his 
apparent Blackmun-like slide while on the Court from conservative to 
liberal (at least, as relative to the Court as a whole).
6
 
Despite his momentous contribution to Casey and the role that that 
case has played,
7
 we ought to be wary of remembering Justice Souter only 
as a co-author of that single case, a Republican disappointment, or a liberal 
savior. He did, after all, write 326 opinions while on the Supreme Court
8
 
(and lent an often crucial vote to hundreds more), including memorable 
 
 
  Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. An early draft of this paper 
was selected for presentation at the Junior/Senior Faculty Workshop on Judges and Judging at 
American University Washington College of Law. Many thanks for comments received there. Special 
thanks to Steve Burbank and Mark Killenbeck for insightful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Justice Souter to Retire, NPR.ORG, Apr. 30, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103694193. 
 2. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Unbound, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at WK1. 
 3. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, DAVID HACKETT SOUTER: TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN ON THE 
REHNQUIST COURT, at ix (2005) (calling Souter‘s performance before the Judiciary Committee 
―masterful‖); id. at 129–39, 142. 
 4. Some have gone so far as to call him ―mediocre.‖ See Todd Zywicki, Justice Souter and 
Accidents of History, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://volokh.com/posts/1241470524.shtml (May 4, 
2009, 4:55 PM) (―I don‘t think that anyone would champion Souter as a [sic] anything other than a 
mediocre Justice. . . . Souter is by any measure a weak link on the Court most would think.‖); cf. Orin 
Kerr, A Different Take on Justice Souter, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://volokh.com/posts/ 
1241474985.shtml (May 4, 2009, 6:09 PM) (disagreeing with the term ―mediocre‖ but admitting that 
―he is not a great writer: His opinions don‘t ‗sing‘‖). 
 5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 6. See YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at x–xi, 190; Greenhouse, supra note 2, at WK6; cf. CONG. 
QUARTERLY, THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 204–05 (1990) (documenting Justice Blackmun‘s 
similar movement). 
 7. See generally Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the 
Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1322 (2009) (recounting the importance of Casey and arguing 
that the case ―significantly settled the abortion dispute‖). 
 8. This figure was calculated using the Boolean search (―souter, j., filed‖ ―souter, j., delivered‖) 
in WestLaw‘s SCT database. 
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opinions in areas of constitutional criminal law,
9
 equal protection,
10
 the 
First Amendment,
11
 and federalism.
12
 Even in the relatively apolitical 
world of federal procedure, Justice Souter left an impression. He wrote 
extensively on the Federal Arbitration Act,
13
 voiced thoughtful views on 
the doctrine of standing,
14
 and moved the law forward in the areas of 
preemption
15
 and federal question jurisdiction.
16
 
We should, therefore, consider more of Justice Souter in commenting 
on his legacy. I will not attempt a comprehensive look—I leave that for 
the biographers and Court-watchers. But I will strive to offer a different 
view of Justice Souter, one that is itself admittedly narrow, but at least is 
outside of the proverbial defining moments and thus provides, perhaps, an 
enriching perspective. I focus on Justice Souter‘s views on the federal civil 
rules.
17
 
Justice Souter appears to have shied away from writing opinions that 
addressed the civil rules for most of his tenure on the Court. The first 
opinion he wrote—either for the Court or for himself—that directly 
addressed a federal civil rule was Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
18
 issued 
almost a decade after he joined the Court. Over the next eight years, he 
authored only one other opinion on the civil rules, dissenting in Mayle v. 
 
 
 9. See generally Scott P. Johnson, The Judicial Behavior of Justice Souter in Criminal Cases 
and the Denial of a Conservative Counterrevolution, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 10. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Heather K. Gerken, Justice Souter 
and the Voting Rights Act, BALKINIZATION, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/justice-souter-and-
voting-rights-act.html (May 5, 2009, 2:17 PM) (arguing that Souter‘s legacy is tied to his voting rights 
jurisprudence). 
 11. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
(Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 13. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting); 14 
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting); Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000). 
 14. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 15. See, e.g., Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006); Am. Ins. Ass‘n v. Garamendi, 
539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 16. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 17. I use the term ―civil rules‖ to refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
noncriminal rules in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. I might also include noncriminal rules 
in the Federal Rules of Evidence as well, but, alas, Justice Souter wrote no independent opinions 
specifically addressing them. 
 18. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
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Felix.
19
 After mid-2007, however, Justice Souter showed considerably 
more willingness to write on the civil rules. In the span of a little over two 
years, he authored the blockbuster pleadings case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly;
20
 a passionate dissent in Bowles v. Russell;
21
 and a dissent in 
Twombly‘s equally important progeny, Ashcroft v. Iqbal.22 
A survey of these five opinions by Justice Souter reveals that he is not 
uniformly historicist, textualist, formalist, instrumentalist, pragmaticist, or 
minimalist when it comes to the civil rules. It does, however, manifest a 
commitment to construing the civil rules in a way that would treat litigants 
fairly in court.
23
 
To be sure, there are many different conceptions of procedural 
fairness. One Justice‘s fairness may be another‘s folly. My aim is not to 
define and evaluate the merits of Justice Souter‘s somewhat ad hoc 
conception of individualized procedural fairness here (which might be 
quite different than, say, Justice Scalia‘s conception of fairness as 
discretion-limiting rules or, perhaps, Justice Breyer‘s conception of 
systemic fairness through pragmatism); rather, I aim to show only that he 
was committed to his particular version of it.  
That commitment manifests itself most clearly through the words that 
Justice Souter chose to explain his reasoning in these cases.
24
 In each one, 
 
 
 19. 545 U.S. 644 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also wrote for the Court in Roell 
v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003), which construed the power of magistrate judges in civil cases under 
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
 20. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 21. 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 22. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also authored a lone 
concurrence and dissent in Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008) (Souter, J., 
concurring & dissenting), but his opinion was but a paragraph that agreed in significant part with the 
Court‘s opinion and disagreed only with the outright reversal by the Court instead of vacating and 
remanding. 
 23. I surveyed only opinions that Justice Souter authored, not those that he silently joined. No 
doubt, a Justice‘s votes may represent his views just as well as his pen, but silent votes can also be 
misleading; just because a Justice joins an opinion does not mean that he joins all aspects of that 
opinion. It would be difficult to tell when a silent vote was an endorsement of the opinion‘s procedural 
philosophy and when it was motivated by other factors. Discerning that likely would depend upon a 
comparison to the Justice‘s authored opinions, so one might as well start with the authored opinions. 
 24. Those words are important—he largely wrote his own opinions and, by all accounts, chose 
his words deliberately. See YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at 68, 160; see also Kerr, supra note 4 
(―[Justice Souter‘s] words are 100% his own.‖). As a light-hearted example, Justice Souter used the 
word ―nub‖ thirteen times in twelve different opinions during his tenure on the Court. By contrast, in 
the entire history of the Court, all other justices have used it in only fifty-seven opinions. Of course, 
authored opinions may not wholly reflect a Justice‘s views if, for example, the author tempered his 
views to secure a majority, to comport with stare decisis, or for an underlying public purpose. 
Although I believe, as I explain more fully below, that Justice Souter‘s commitment to the fair 
treatment of litigants under the civil rules is reliable, I acknowledge that these other motivating factors 
could have played a role. 
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he consistently expressed that commitment in a variety of contexts, 
including concern for the fair treatment of unrepresented class members, 
pro se plaintiffs, parties relying on judicial decrees, defendants seeking to 
avoid burdensome discovery, and plaintiffs seeking access to civil justice. 
In short, Justice Souter‘s own words show his deep commitment to the fair 
procedural treatment of individual litigants in our civil justice system. 
II. JUSTICE SOUTER‘S CIVIL RULES OPINIONS 
Each of Justice Souter‘s five major opinions implicating the civil 
rules—Ortiz, Mayle, Bowles, Twombly, and Iqbal—shows his concern for 
the fair treatment of civil litigants. 
A. Ortiz 
In Ortiz,
25
 that concern was for absent class members faced with 
inadequate representation and the inability to opt out of the resulting 
settlement of their claims. Ortiz involved the certification of an asbestos 
class action submitted for settlement approval. The settlement was 
negotiated in the midst of the asbestos litigation crisis—hundreds of 
thousands of potential claimants existed, and asbestos manufacturers did 
not have the funds to pay all of the claims. Just a few years previously, in 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Court had acknowledged the crisis 
and pleaded for a pragmatic legislative solution,
26
 but that did not happen, 
and the crisis came to the Court again in Ortiz. 
In Ortiz, the parties agreed to a settlement, whereby the principal 
defendant, Fibreboard (which was on the verge of bankruptcy), would 
fund a trust to process and pay class members‘ asbestos claims, but the 
entitlements would be substantially limited.
27
 Fibreboard‘s looming 
insolvency and the need for an end to the asbestos crisis might have 
prompted some, such as Justice Breyer, to overlook some protections to 
unnamed class members in order to resolve the crisis pragmatically.
28
 
But Justice Souter would not. Vacating the settlement order, Justice 
Souter held that the class action failed to meet the requirements of a so-
called ―limited fund‖ class under Rule 23(b)(1) because the settlement 
fund was limited by agreement rather than external factors. He expressed 
 
 
 25. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 26. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628–29 (1997). 
 27. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 827, 850, 852. 
 28. See id. at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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concern that the fund was limited not by necessity, but by conflicted class 
counsel, to the detriment of the unnamed class members, who could not 
opt out of a biased settlement. In addition, fairness to the unnamed class 
members, who can neither opt out nor have their voices heard throughout 
the settlement negotiation process, required heightened attention to 
Rule 23(a)‘s structural due process protections, which the Ortiz settlement 
did not meet.
29
 
Justice Souter‘s opinion is meticulous, and its jurisprudence is varied. 
In places, he is traditionalist, hewing closely to the historical model of a 
―limited fund‖ in assessing its scope.30 In others, he is originalist, 
conforming to the meaning that Rule 23 had at its adoption.
31
 In still 
others, he is a dutiful follower of precedent, namely Amchem.
32
 Overall, he 
is shockingly un-pragmatic. Unlike Justice Breyer, who—in dissent—
suggested that he might relax the strictures of Rule 23 to deal with the 
crisis pragmatically, Justice Souter‘s opinion adheres rigidly to Rule 23 
and the rulemaking process that produced it.
33
 
But, tellingly, what underlay his formalism was a deep concern for 
unnamed class members and the overall fairness of the class litigation. He 
was skeptical of the class representatives‘ and counsels‘ assertions without 
a more thorough independent scrutiny of the fund and its fairness to all of 
the class plaintiffs.
34
 As he wrote, ―[W]e are not free to dispense with the 
safeguards that have protected mandatory class members . . . .‖35 
B. Mayle 
Mayle v. Felix
36
 showed Justice Souter‘s conception of fairness in a 
different light—as a concern for pro se litigants. The issue in Mayle was 
whether Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 
habeas petitioner to add an untimely claim to a petition that originally was 
filed timely. That issue was implicated by convicted felon Jacoby Felix, 
who filed, pro se, a timely civil habeas petition, alleging a violation of the 
 
 
 29. Id. at 838, 848–49 (majority opinion). 
 30. Id. at 842 (―The prudent course . . . is to presume that when subdivision (b)(1)(B) was 
devised to cover limited fund actions, the object was to stay close to the historical model.‖). 
 31. Id. at 861 (―The nub of our position is that we are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood 
it upon its adoption . . . .‖). 
 32. Id. at 861–64. 
 33. Id. at 858; id. at 861 (―[W]e are not free to alter it except through the process prescribed by 
Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.‖). 
 34. Id. at 857 & n.31. 
 35. Id. at 862. 
 36. 545 U.S. 644 (2005).  
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Sixth Amendment‘s Confrontation Clause.37 Three months before the 
expiration of the habeas statute‘s one-year time limit,38 the district court 
appointed him counsel. Five months after the time limit, and before any 
responsive pleading to his Confrontation Clause petition had been served, 
Felix‘s counsel filed an amended petition, adding a new claim for a 
violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
39
 Felix 
argued that Rule 15(c), which applies to habeas petitions generally,
40
 
allowed that claim to ―relate[] back‖ to the time of the original petition 
because it ―arose out of the [same] conduct, transaction, or occurrence‖ as 
the original pleading.
41
 
The Court disagreed and held that Felix‘s amendment could not relate 
back because the grounds for relief were supported by facts that differed in 
both time and type from his timely Sixth Amendment claim. Therefore, his 
Fifth Amendment claim was time-barred by the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act‘s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations.42 
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, suggested that 
text, congressional intent, and precedent all supported a contrary view, 
although he stated that none of these provided a sure answer.
43
 He also 
noted, but did not rely on, a purposive argument: because statutes of 
limitations are designed to provide predictability and finality to those who 
may face claims, the filing of one habeas claim within the statute of 
limitations ought to lift the statute for all habeas claims by the same 
petitioner, for the state is already on notice and must defend the underlying 
decision.
44
 
Instead, what seemed to be the deciding factor for Justice Souter was 
―the unfortunate consequence that the Court‘s view creates an unfair 
disparity between indigent habeas petitioners and those able to afford their 
 
 
 37. Id. at 648. 
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006). 
 39. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 648–49. 
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006) (providing that habeas petitions ―may be amended . . . as provided 
in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions‖); see also R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 11 
(permitting the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in habeas cases unless inconsistent 
with statute or the habeas rules). 
 41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(2) (repealed 2007). 
 42. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. The Court characterized Felix‘s Fifth Amendment claim as a pretrial 
violation that was temporally and factually distinct from his trial-based Confrontation Clause claim. Id. 
at 660–61. In effect, the Court restricted Rule 15(c)(2) to claims united by a ―common core of 
operative facts.‖ Id. at 659 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43. Id. at 668 & n.2, 670–74 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 667 (―The text alone does not 
tell us the answer. . .‖); id. at 676 n.9 (asserting that the text is ―ambiguous‖). 
 44. Id. at 666. 
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own counsel.‖45 Noting that most habeas petitioners file their initial 
petitions pro se and that judges likely will not appoint counsel until after 
the AEDPA deadline has run, Justice Souter reasoned that the Court‘s 
view handicapped appointed counsel‘s professional judgment in adding 
additional claims, a handicap that a habeas petitioner represented at the 
outset would not face: ―The rule the Court adopts today may not make 
much difference to prisoners with enough money to hire their own 
counsel; but it will matter a great deal to poor prisoners who need 
appointed counsel to see and plead facts showing a colorable basis for 
relief.‖46 
In sum, Justice Souter‘s consequentialist construction of Rule 15 
stemmed from his concern for the fair treatment of unrepresented habeas 
petitioners. ―[T]he real consequences of today‘s decision‖ he intoned, 
―will fall most heavily on the shoulders of indigent habeas petitioners who 
can afford no counsel without the assistance of the court.‖47 
C. Bowles 
In Ortiz and Mayle, Justice Souter‘s concern for the fair treatment of 
individual litigants was mixed with a variety of other interpretative and 
jurisprudential heuristics. But in Bowles v. Russell,
48
 his concern was front 
and center. 
Keith Bowles was convicted by an Ohio jury of murder and received a 
sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment. After exhausting his state 
appeals, Bowles timely filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was 
denied. Bowles failed to appeal the district court‘s denial within the 
deadline and instead moved to reopen the time to appeal under Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). On 
February 10, 2004, the district court granted Bowles‘s motion and 
reopened the time to appeal, giving Bowles until February 27 to file his 
notice of appeal. Bowles filed his notice of appeal on February 26. 
Although timely under the district court‘s order, the notice of appeal was 
untimely under the rule and statute, which allow reopened time periods to 
persist for only fourteen days. Consequently, the State moved to dismiss 
the appeal as untimely. Bowles argued that his untimeliness should be 
 
 
 45. Id. at 665. 
 46. Id. at 676. 
 47. Id. at 675. 
 48. 551 U.S. 205 (2007). 
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excused for justifiable reliance on the district court‘s order, but the court 
of appeals agreed with the State and dismissed the appeal.
49
 
The Supreme Court affirmed, largely on the basis of precedent. The 
Court cited a string of cases dating back to 1848 and stated, ―This Court 
has long held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is 
‗mandatory and jurisdictional.‘‖50 Because the time deadline was 
jurisdictional, it could not be excused for the reasons proffered by 
Bowles.
51
 
In dissent, Justice Souter did not dispute this long-historical treatment. 
Instead, he focused on the particularly unfair consequences to Bowles in 
this case, as the opening of his dissent explains: ―It is intolerable for the 
judicial system to treat people this way, and there is not even a technical 
justification for condoning this bait and switch.‖52 He continued later, ―We 
have the authority to recognize an equitable exception to the 14-day limit, 
and we should do that here, as it certainly seems reasonable to rely on an 
order from a federal judge.‖53  
Justice Souter concluded his dissent the same way he began it—
bemoaning the unfairness of strictly applying the terms of Rule 4 to 
Bowles: ―As a member of the Federal Judiciary, I cannot help but think 
that reliance on our orders is reasonable. I would also rest better knowing 
that my innocent errors will not jeopardize anyone‘s rights unless 
absolutely necessary.‖54 
D. Twombly and Iqbal 
If Bowles was the most forceful voicing of Justice Souter‘s concern for 
the fair treatment of civil litigants, it was not the last. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
55
 
and its forebear, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
56—together the biggest 
pleadings cases in fifty years—show Justice Souter‘s commitment to fair 
treatment at its most balanced. 
In Twombly, two plaintiffs filed a class action complaint on behalf of 
all subscribers of local telephone or high-speed internet services against 
 
 
 49. Id. at 207. 
 50. Id. at 209. 
 51. Id. at 213–14. For a criticism of this conclusion, see Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. 
Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631 (2008). 
 52. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 215 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at 220. 
 54. Id. at 220 n.7 (citation omitted). 
 55. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 56. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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local exchange carriers for antitrust conspiracies, in violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act.
57
 They alleged the conspiracy solely on grounds of 
conscious parallel conduct.
58
 The defendants moved to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because, they argued, 
conscious parallel conduct is not itself illegal—the plaintiff must prove 
more than that in order to be entitled to relief. 
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, agreed that the complaint should 
be dismissed because it failed to meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8‘s 
requirement that the allegations ―show[] that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.‖59 In the process, he placed new gloss on Rule 8: 
While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . 
a plaintiff‘s obligation to provide the ―grounds‖ of his entitlement to 
relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level . . . .
60
  
This gloss has come to be known as the ―plausibility standard‖ of 
Rule 8,
61
 and the plaintiffs in Twombly did not meet it.
62
 
In creating the plausibility standard, Justice Souter only casually relied 
upon Rule 8‘s textual requirement of ―showing‖ entitlement to relief and 
instead focused more on prior gloss contained in the 1957 case Conley v. 
Gibson, which required pleaders to allege the ―grounds‖ of their claims.63 
But in the same breath, Justice Souter interred other language from Conley 
that would have undermined dismissal in Twombly.
64
 
Justice Souter‘s real motivation for the plausibility standard was 
protecting defendants from burdensome discovery in meritless cases. 
―[A]ntitrust discovery can be expensive,‖ he asserted, and therefore ―a 
district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in 
pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to 
proceed.‖65 
 
 
 57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).  
 58. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550, 554. 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 60. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 61. See Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. 
IN BRIEF 135, 136 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf. 
 62. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57. 
 63. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
 64. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (―retir[ing]‖ Conley‘s famous ―no set of facts‖ language). 
 65. Id. at 558. 
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In dissent, Justice Stevens pointed to the ability of a district judge to 
control discovery costs and oversee the discovery process if allegations are 
weak,
66
 but Justice Souter responded that such judicial supervision is 
inadequate: 
 It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible 
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the 
discovery process through careful case management, given the 
common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking 
discovery abuse has been on the modest side. . . . [T]he threat of 
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle 
even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably, 
then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the 
level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the 
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no 
reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal 
relevant evidence.
67
 
Unlike Ortiz, Twombly is nonoriginalist and pragmatic, looking to the 
problems of modern complex litigation and trying to solve them without 
resort to the rulemaking process.
68
 But the two cases do share a common 
thread. Just as Ortiz was an attempt to ensure fairness to unnamed class 
members, Twombly‘s plausibility standard is designed to protect 
defendants from unfair discovery costs in near-frivolous litigation. 
But it is impossible to fully understand Justice Souter in Twombly 
without considering his dissent in its progeny, Iqbal, and consideration of 
that case along with Twombly makes Justice Souter‘s position clear. His 
position in the two cases represents the two sides of the fairness debate on 
pleadings. Iqbal
69
 involved a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint 
by a federal detainee against John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General 
of the United States, and Robert Mueller, the Director of the FBI. The 
complaint alleged that these defendants adopted an unconstitutional policy 
that subjected plaintiff Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement on 
account of his race, religion, or national origin. The defendants raised the 
 
 
 66. Id. at 593–95 & 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 559 (majority opinion) (internal citations, alterations, and quotations omitted). 
 68. My thanks to Steve Burbank for raising this point. I note, as well, that this nonoriginalist 
approach was, perhaps, uncharacteristic of Justice Souter. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Justice Souter’s 
Conservatism, ACSBLOG, http://www.acslaw.org/node/13546 (June 9, 2009, 12:07 PM) (―Make no 
mistake: The best originalist on the Supreme Court is not Antonin Scalia or Clarence Thomas, but 
David Souter.‖). 
 69. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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defense of qualified immunity and moved to dismiss for failure to meet the 
pleading strictures of Rule 8, as interpreted by Twombly.
70
 
The Court held that Twombly‘s plausibility standard applies 
transsubstantively to all claims, including Iqbal‘s. Further, the Court held 
that conclusory factual allegations are not entitled to deference at the 
motion to dismiss stage—that, instead, they may be ignored. Under these 
standards, the Court held that Iqbal had failed to state a claim because his 
nonconclusory factual allegations did not plausibly suggest that the 
defendants acted with a discriminatory motive.
71
 
Dissenting, Justice Souter disagreed with the Court‘s decision in two 
ways that are important to my claim here. First, he disagreed with the 
Court‘s limited view of Iqbal‘s allegations. The Court discarded most of 
Iqbal‘s allegations as conclusory and thus not entitled to a presumption of 
truth. Justice Souter, on the other hand, believed that the complaint as a 
whole presented a plausible claim for relief.
72
 As such, the satisfaction of 
the plausibility standard adequately protected the defendants against the 
unfair litigation costs that so concerned him in Twombly. 
Second, Justice Souter would have accepted, for purposes of motions 
to dismiss, the concessions made by the defendants as to the legal scope of 
the relief available. Ashcroft and Mueller had conceded that their liability 
could stem from a supervisor‘s knowledge of a subordinate‘s 
unconstitutional conduct and deliberate indifference to that conduct. The 
Court nevertheless took the issue sua sponte and decided to the contrary.
73
 
But Justice Souter would have accepted the concession, at least out of 
fairness to Iqbal. He wrote: 
 Finally, the Court‘s approach is most unfair to Iqbal. He was 
entitled to rely on Ashcroft and Mueller‘s concession, both in their 
petition for certiorari and in their merits briefs, that they could be 
held liable on a theory of knowledge and deliberate indifference. By 
overriding that concession, the Court denies Iqbal a fair chance to 
be heard on the question.
74
 
 
 
 70. Id. at 1944. 
 71. Id. at 1951–52. 
 72. Id. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 1956. 
 74. Id. at 1957; see also id. at 1958 n.2 (―[I]ts approach is even more unfair to Iqbal . . . for Iqbal 
had no reason to argue the (apparently dispositive) supervisory liability standard in light of the 
concession.‖). 
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Thus, Justice Souter‘s commitment to fair treatment of the litigants—
indeed, for both the plaintiff and the defendants in Iqbal—was critical to 
his opinion. 
III. SOME THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As I have highlighted above, Justice Souter‘s concern for the fair 
treatment of litigants animated his civil rules opinions. That concern 
protected unnamed and ill-represented class members from a potentially 
unfair settlement, tried to provide habeas petitioners with fair 
representation of counsel, insisted that the appellate timing rules not 
condone a judicial bait and switch, protected defendants from bearing 
unfair discovery burdens associated with truly meritless cases, and would 
have held that plaintiffs opposing motions to dismiss be entitled to rely 
upon concessions made by defendants about the right to relief. 
Of course, a robust concern for the fair treatment of civil litigants is 
not the only concern or philosophy that Justice Souter espouses in those 
opinions. He is not so one-faceted, and I do not claim that Justice Souter is 
only concerned with procedural fairness to civil litigants. To the contrary, 
Justice Souter also exhibited textualist, historicist, pragmaticist, 
minimalist, activist, deferential, and formalist approaches to the civil rules, 
though he did not employ any of them consistently.  
But a common strand throughout all of the cases is an expressed 
concern that the civil rules treat each litigant fairly. That demonstrates that 
he at least is consistently concerned with procedural fairness to litigants 
and that that concern is a dominant feature of his civil rules jurisprudence. 
In retrospect, one might have guessed that that concern would be 
apparent in Justice Souter‘s opinions. By all accounts, he personally 
values sincerity, politeness, and professionalism, and he exhibits great 
empathy for others.
75
 He exhibited these traits himself while on the 
Supreme Court‘s bench; he consistently treated others with respect, 
dignity, and politeness, especially party litigants.
76
 Unlike some of his 
colleagues, his oral argument questioning was insistent but not aggressive 
or condescending. Indeed, he seemed to have consciously avoided even 
appearing to be unduly aggressive toward litigants. In one instance, for 
example, while Justice Souter was a state judge, he wrote to an attorney to 
apologize for what he viewed as a particularly probing set of questions 
 
 
 75. See YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at 13, 22, 25, 64, 127, 129, 134. 
 76. See id. at 54–55, 64, 155. 
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during oral argument.
77
 It is no surprise, given the accounts of his 
character, that Justice Souter would understand and take into account the 
daunting challenges of civil litigation. 
It also would not surprise me if other studies of Justice Souter‘s 
jurisprudence resulted in the conclusion that he was committed to 
procedural fairness to litigants in other areas. Indeed, my relatively narrow 
claim about the civil rules, if indicative of a broader commitment by 
Justice Souter, might help explain some anomalies in his jurisprudence in 
other areas. 
Take the criminal context, for example. Although Justice Souter was 
seen as a moderately liberal justice for most of his tenure on the Court, the 
one area in which he was described as moderately conservative was 
criminal cases. But Justice Souter was most likely to side with a criminal 
defendant on procedural issues that affected the defendant‘s fair trial than 
on substantive issues.
78
 It does not seem unlikely that the motivation to 
ensure fair treatment to civil litigants would also motivate Justice Souter to 
construe criminal procedural rules in the same vein. 
Further studies will be necessary to flesh out a holistic picture of 
Justice Souter.
79
 But, for now, these federal civil rules cases provide 
evidence of his commitment to the civil rules‘ fair treatment of litigants. 
They sketch the outline of Justice Souter, Proceduralist. 
 
 
 77. See id. at 118. 
 78. See id. at 92, 234–37. 
 79. One other commentator has noted Justice Souter‘s commitment to the fair treatment of 
litigants, relying upon non-civil-rules decisions in his early years on the Court. See Liang Kan, 
Comment, A Theory of Justice Souter, 45 EMORY L.J. 1373 (1996). 
 
